ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The contribution game (or public goods game) is an N-person game where the participating agents have two choices: to cooperate by contributing to some public good or use the benefits of other agents' contributions, i.e. defect (Hamburger, 1979) . The greater proportion of the agents chooses to contribute, the better is the outcome for everyone. From the point of view of Game Theory, this is an N-person Prisoners' Dilemma like the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) .
Indeed, if P corresponds to the punishment when no one contributes, R is the reward when all agents contribute, T is the temptation not to contribute when everybody else does, and S is the sucker's payoff for contributing alone, then for this game T > R > P > S
As a result of its choice, each agent receives a reward or punishment (payoff) that is dependent on its choice as well as the choices of all the others. The payoff functions are given as two curves:
C(x) for contributors and D(x) for defectors where x is the ratio of contributors with respect to the Games Review URL: www.pakinsight.com total number of agents. S and R are the end points of the C(x) function; P and T are the end points of the D(x) function. Regardless of what the other agents do, each agent receives a lower payoff for contributing than for refusing to contribute but all agents receive a lower payoff if all defect than if all contribute. Therefore, the defectors' payoff function D(x) is above that of the contributors C(x) (Figure 1 ).
Theoretical investigations of contribution games are available from the literature (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Gale, 2001; Lockwood and Thomas, 2002; Duffy et al., 2007; Matthews, 2013) .
Agent-based simulation will be used in this paper to investigate these games. The simulations were performed by the use of our agent-based simulation tool (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000) that is suitable for any iterated N-person game with a wide range of user-defined parameters. The agents are stochastic learning cellular automata situated on a two-dimensional grid and their number is equal to 10,000. We consider the contribution game as an iterated game. The aggregate proportion of contributors changes over subsequent iterations. At each iteration, every agent chooses an action according to the payoff received for its previous action. The updating occurs simultaneously for all agents. With each iteration, the software tool draws the array of agents in a window on the computer's screen, with each agent in the array colored according to its most recent action. The experimenter can view and record the evolution of the society of agents as it changes in time. After a certain number of iterations the proportion of cooperators usually stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. The outcome of any N-person game strongly depends on the agents' personalities and the depth of the agents' neighborhood (Szilagyi, 2003a) . In this paper, two personality types will be used: Pavlovian and greedy.
For Pavlovian agents the probability of choosing the previously chosen action again changes by an amount proportional to the reward/penalty for the previous action. If an action is followed by a reward, then the tendency of the agent to produce that particular action is reinforced. For such agents we considered the case when the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents and also the case of the one-layer deep neighborhood.
Greedy agents imitate the choice of their neighbor who received the highest reward for its previous action. For such agents if the neighborhood extends to the entire collective of agents, they will all defect immediately at the first iteration because the defectors always receive a higher reward than the contributors. Therefore, we considered only the case when each agent looks at its immediate neighbors only (one-layer deep neighborhood).
In summary, we performed the following simulations for each case:
a)
Pavlovian agents when the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents. In this case the validity of Equation 2 was also checked.
b)
Pavlovian agents when the neighborhood is one layer deep.
c)
Greedy agents when the neighborhood is one layer deep.
Each simulation was performed for the entire range of the initial ratio of cooperators (0 < x 0 < 1).
great practical importance because its study may lead to a better understanding of the factors stimulating or inhibiting cooperative behavior within social systems.
We have shown (Szilagyi, 2012 ) that for Pavlovian agents if the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents and the cooperators receive the same total payoff as the defectors, i.e.,
an equilibrium occurs. If this equation has two real solutions x 1 and x 2 (x 2 > x 1 ) in the interval 0 < x < 1, then x 1 is a stable attractor and x 2 is an unstable repulsor. When the initial cooperation ratio is below x 2 , the solution of the game converges toward x 1 as an oscillation while it stabilizes exactly when the initial cooperation ratio is above x 2 .
The payoff functions shown in Figure 1 are
Substituting these into Equation (2) we obtain the quadratic equation 4x 2 -3.5x + 0.5 = 0 (4) Its solutions are x 1 = 0.1798 and x 2 = 0.6952. Our simulations confirmed this result. We also investigated the case when the neighborhood is one layer deep (Szilagyi, 2003b) .
For greedy agents, however, Equation (2) is not applicable. For the case of the one-layer-deep neighborhood the result is shown in Figure 2 . The horizontal axis represents the number of iterations, the vertical axis shows the ratio of contributors x. The different curves correspond to different values of the initial ratio of contributors x 0 . As we see, the ratio of contributors jumps down at the first iteration but then gradually increases to a high value (above 0.8). It is very strange that the lower is the initial value the higher is the final result x final (the curves all cross each other).
The results are shown in the following table: These results completely coincide with those obtained in Szilagyi (2003b) .
The Amount of Contribution is Variable but the Contributions are Equally Important
We investigated two extreme cases. In the first, the amount of contribution grows when the number of contributors increases ( Figure 3 ). In the second it is the other way around (Figure 4 ).
The payoff functions shown in Figure 3 are C(x) = 2x -1 and D(x) = 2.5x -1
Substituting these into Equation (2) 
Substituting these into Equation (2) we obtain the quadratic equation 
The Amount of Contribution is Constant but the Values of the Contributions are Variable
Let us first consider the case when the amount of contribution is constant but the first few contributions are more important than the last few (Hamburger, 1979) . The payoff functions shown in Figure 11 are C(x) = -2x 2 + 4x -1 and D(x) = -2x 2 + 4x -0.5
Substituting these into Equation (2) we obtain the cubic equation 
CONCLUSION
Agent-based simulation was performed for various contribution games. The amount of contribution can be constant or variable and the first few contributions are less, more, or equally important than the last few. We found that the results strongly depend on the participating agents' personalities. For Pavlovian agents when the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents we found that the value of the attractor x 1 is highest when the contributions are equally important and the amount of contribution grows when the number of contributors increases. The value of x 1 is lowest when the amount of contribution is constant but the first few contributions are more important than the last few. For Pavlovian agents when the neighborhood is one layer deep the final solutions x final are usually higher than x 1 and strongly depend on the initial value x 0 . In the case when the amount of contribution is constant but the first few contributions are less important than the last few, the solutions start to oscillate around x final that is a little higher than x 1 and this oscillation starts much slower than when the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents. Figure-2. Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are greedy, Figure 1 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve. Figure 11 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve. Figure-13 . Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, Figure 11 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve. Figure-14 . Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are greedy, Figure 11 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve. Figure-15 . Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are greedy, Figure 11 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graph shows the proportion of contributing agents as a function of the number of iterations for 5000 iterations. The initial cooperation ratio is x0 = 0.2. Figure-16 . A snapshot of the graphics output of the simulation shown in Figure 15 after the 500th iteration. The black dots represent contributors, the white ones are free riders. Figure 18 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve. Figure-21 . Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, Figure 18 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graph shows the proportion of contributing agents as a function of the number of iterations for 5000 iterations. The initial cooperation ratio is x0 = 0.8. Figure-22 . Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are greedy, Figure 18 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is one layer deep. The graphs show the proportions of contributing agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratio x0 is shown at each curve.
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